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ABSTRACT 
A successful outcome of Russian President Medvedev’s recent economic modernization 
plan, also known as “Smart Russia,” could result in a more democratic and prosperous 
Russia.  However, corruption and an energy dependent economy in Russia continue to 
exist as the main barriers in preventing substantial economic liberalization and a 
transition to a higher level of economic development.  Failure by the Russian leadership 
to address these issues could result in future economic and political turmoil, potentially 
leading to a more fragile Russian state.  The understanding of corruption within an 
energy dependent economy, and the international tools available in Russia’s economic 
modernization process, are critical to establishing effective U.S. foreign policy and 
economic partnerships.  To better understand the difficult steps that lie ahead for Russia, 
an economic statistical analysis, using global economic indexes, was conducted in a three 
scenario framework to determine which criteria Russia needs to improve in to ensure a 
transition to the next stage of economic development.  The results of the analysis present 
crucial evidence for a successful economic transition.  Failure by the U.S. and the West to 
adequately understand Russia’s modernization challenges could result in a missed 
opportunity for future Russian political and economic liberalization.   
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A. MODERNIZATION IN RUSSIA 
Throughout the past centuries, Russian leaders have undertaken multiple steps 
toward modernization in a quest to transform Russia economically and remain 
competitive with the Western world.  In past modernization efforts, unique barriers 
presented themselves, which prevented dynamic changes in the economic structure of 
Russia.  In the seventeenth-early eighteenth centuries, Peter the Great modernized Russia 
by adopting Western forms of government structures.  Even though progress was made, 
the state apparatus was weak, unable to overcome an agrarian society based on serfdom.1  
Alexander II also faced unique challenges in his quest for modernization; the 
emancipation of the serfs would later act as a liberal catalyst in the country.  However, 
the weak economic and social structures prevented him from completely transforming the 
Russian culture towards modernization.  Gorbachev faced barriers for his perestroika; the 
“restructuring” faced its largest hurdle in the Soviet economy, which inhibited any real 
change without fundamentally altering the very design of the state.   
Russian leaders today are faced with new challenges, but some historic Russian 
traits continue to manifest themselves.  Today, President Medvedev faces multiple 
challenges for his plan for economic modernization, coined “Smart Russia,” largely due 
to the remnants of the communist legacy in the economic system and Russian culture.  
Medvedev hopes to revive the greatness of Russia, to build its economy into one that 
competes globally in a new technological market built from a strong foundation of his 
plan for a “knowledge economy.”  One goal he is pursuing is to build the proper business 
and science environment to stop the “brain-drain” that has occurred over the past 
decades, as potential innovators have been leaving for the free West to pursue friendly 
environments for business and innovation.   
                                                 
1 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, a Book of Essays 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962), 135. 
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The modernization plan has grasped the attention of the world, leaving both 
Europe and the United States wondering if there is any substance to the modernization 
rhetoric from the Kremlin.  U.S. and European actors will undoubtedly be affected by the 
success or failure of Medvedev’s plan, which is why they must take proactive measures 
to understand the nature of the current modernization effort in Russia.  Russian 
modernization efforts have historically provided an opportunity for domestic economic 
and political reforms, but have also provided international actors an opportunity to assist 
and promote new long sought European integration into the Russian state.  International 
actors must use this opportunity to first understand the nature of the challenge of Russian 
modernization, and second, use their understanding to provide substantial assistance 
through economic measures, which could eventually lead to pro-democracy political 
reforms in the Russian government. 
One of the main barriers that Russian leaders have faced in the past is “resistance 
to change.”2  The state-managed structure of the Russian economy created an elite class 
that does not necessarily want reform or modernization.  For this class, their own survival 
and economic standing are at stake, since their power is directly tied to the ability of the 
state to control vast portions of the economy.  As stated by Lilia Shevtsova from the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Moscow, “A state based on merger of 
power, ownership, and suppression of competition destroys all reforming impulses.  Such 
a state obstructs modernization by its very nature.”3  The historic nature of the political 
and economic relationship continues to provide an economic reliance on political actors 
for formal and informal transactions.  The Russian leadership has reached a crossroads in 
formulating a strategy to modernize its economy.  The arrival at the crossroads occurred 
due to the recent decline of the Russian state from the financial crisis of 2008.  This has 
given concern to the political actors that steps must be taken to enable Russia to compete 
in the global economy and move beyond its energy dependent economy. 
                                                 
2 Roderick Kefferputz and Felix Krawatzek, "The Same Old Modernisation Game?  Russian 
Interpretations of Modernisation," CEPS Working Document no.337/September 2010 (September 2010), 
http:www.ceps.eu (accessed November 4, 2010). 
3 Ibid. 
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The “resistance to change” is further ingrained into Russian society by the 
corruptive nature of the Soviet and post-Soviet economic and political systems.  As 
President Medvedev stated in his “Go Russia!” speech, “Centuries of corruption have 
debilitated Russia from time immemorial.  Until today this corrosion has been due to the 
excessive government presence in many significant aspects of economic and other social 
activities.”4  How can economic modernization defeat “centuries of corruption?”  In the 
past, the Russian economy did not have the tools available in today’s globalized market 
that are defined by international integration with economic institutions.  These new tools 
represent a growing allotment of international organizations and non-governmental 
organizations, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the European Union 
(EU), which can help facilitate the process of modernization.   
Obviously, eliminating all corruption in any country is not a realistic outcome in 
any modernization plan, but decreasing corruption to a level that will promote economic 
development, which could allow for future political reform, is vital for Russia.  Through 
empirical economic data this analysis aims to show what areas need to be addressed so 
that sound economic reform can successfully lead to Russia’s modernization.  While 
political reform might prove difficult for Russia in the short term, U.S. and European 
assistance in its economic modernization could help the West seize a rare opportunity to 
promote long sought Russian political reform and reach consensuses on a variety of 
national security issues.  The thesis states that through effective international integration, 
reinforced by improvements in the investment climate through domestic reforms, Russia 
can lower its primary barrier of corruption, and diversify away from an energy 
dependent economy to a level that is consistent with that of Western developed nations.  
The U.S. and EU can assist in its effort by fostering economic cooperation which can 
solidify free market principles and transition Russia to a higher stage of economic 
prosperity, and in turn create a stronger, more democratic Russia, closer aligned with 
U.S. national interests in the twenty-first century. 
                                                 
4 Dimitry Medvedev, "Go Russia!," Kremlin, 
http://www.moscowtopnews.com/?area=postView&id=1546 (accessed August 20, 2010). 
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B. MEDVEDEV’S “SMART RUSSIA” 
Modernization is nothing new in Russia.  Peter the Great, Alexander II, Stalin, 
and Gorbachev all took their own unique and costly steps in transforming Russia into a 
more modernized empire.5  Often external events brought about their realization that in 
order to compete with global actors Russia needed to implement economic reforms.  
These past modernization reforms have lead to harsh criticism within the state, waging 
differing ideas on which course to pursue in modernization.  “They have led to great 
transformations as well as major debates on Russia’s future trajectory, pitting, for 
example, Westernisers (zapadniki) against Slavophiles (slavianofily).”6  Today, the same 
ideological modernization struggle is occurring between Moscow and the West. 
During the 2000s, Russia experienced great economic growth due to a spike in the 
commodities market.  As before, an external event, the global financial crisis, has led 
Russian leadership to the belief that modernization is necessary.  With the accession of 
Medvedev in 2008, there has been almost continuous talk about the importance of 
modernization in Russia.  The 2008 economic crisis further showed the flawed economic 
and political structure that was present in Russia.  Starting in 2009, President Medvedev 
began a campaign for modernization with his article titled, “Go Russia!” and State of the 
Nation speech.7  In his speech, Medvedev recounts that “persistent ills” that have forced 
Russia into becoming a state reliant on raw exports.  “And for the sake of our future it is 
necessary to liberate our country from persistent social ills that inhibit its creative energy 
and restrict our common progress.”8  Two of the main components to achieve 
modernization, according to Medvedev, were overcoming “centuries of corruption…and 
habit of relying on export materials.”9   
                                                 
5 Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, a Book of Essays, 135. 
6 Felix Krawatzek, The Same Old Modernisation Game?  Russian Interpretations of Modernisation, 
November 4, 2010. 




“The success of the ‘Smart Russia’ movement is a question of life and death for 
Russia,”10 stated Zhores Alferov, President Medvedev’s top scientific advisor for the 
Skolkovo Park.  In the past year, Medvedev has taken great steps to initiate the 
modernization program.  First, Moscow has invested in a state-funded research and 
innovation park.  The park, formerly known as the Skolkovo Project, is based in the 
suburbs of Moscow and encompasses the components of other innovation parks.  These 
efforts have been combined with a global marketing campaign by Medvedev.  He 
recently toured Silicon Valley in California in an effort to increase support for Skolkovo 
through monetary ventures.  He has been somewhat successful; in the past year many 
U.S. companies have invested in the Skolkovo Project in an effort to reach an 
underdeveloped area of the world with vast potential.  Cisco and Boeing are just a few of 
the major U.S. global corporations that have invested in the project.11  Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) has initiated a joint venture in research and education with 
the Skolkovo University.12  The Kremlin has taken other unique steps to ensure 
information about the modernization process is available to the public and foreign 
investors.  The Kremlin has opened a Twitter account to advertise into new areas 
previously not popularly traveled.  The Kremlin public relations firm, Ketchum, has 
recently started a website, Modern Russia, which maintains an open forum to discuss 
challenges for economic modernization and informs the reader of the recent successes of 
the new economic programs.13  While these might not seem significant they represent a 
new direction for the Kremlin and could be a signal that some new innovative public 
                                                 
10 Matthews, Russia, Home of the Next Silicon Valley?, 5–5. 
11 "Boeing Partners with Russia on Skolkovo Innovation Center Project," Airline Industry Information 
(M2) (June 6, 2010), 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=B4Z3400992758&site=ehost-
live&scope=site.; Interfax, "Cisco to Help Develop Skolkovo Innovation Hub," Russia & CIS Business & 
Financial Newswire (June 24, 2010), 1, 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bwh&AN=51702426&site=ehost-live&scope=site. 
12 Jason Bush, "Skolkovo Stays on Track with MIT Link," Business Week Online (March 17, 2009), 
24–24, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=37032233&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. 
13 Josh Rogin, "Russia Launches New PR Initiatives Aimed at Attracting Foreign Investment," 
Foreign Policy, 
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/07/22/russia_launches_new_pr_initiative_aimed_at_attracting
_foreign_investment (accessed November 4, 2010). 
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relation measures not previously achieved in past reforms.  These efforts are just some of 
the modernization efforts underway in Russia, however, the question remains if 
Medvedev will undertake the complete modernization of the economic and political 
sphere of influence or just settle for partial reform.  U.S. and European states have taken 
great interests in trying to understand the true nature of the reforms and how they can 
assist Russia in becoming more economically liberal in hopes that economic reform will 
eventually lead to political reform.  
This paper will first analyze the main barriers for modernization, corruption 
(Chapter III) and energy dependence (Chapter IV), to better grasp the direction the 
Russian economy is heading and what potential scenarios lie ahead.  Finally, an empirical 
analysis within three potential scenarios for the Russian economy (Chapter V) will be 
completed of other countries that succeeded in their economic modernization, by 
transitioning to higher stages of economic development.  This will be accomplished by 
analyzing global economic indexes over time in hopes to identify the variables needed for 
Russian modernization.  One of the primary indexes that will be used, the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index, details country stage development.  
The Forum separates country stage development into three stages, “factor-driven,” 
“efficiency-driven,” and “innovation driven.”  The lowest level of development is Stage 
1, “factor-driven” and the highest level of development is Stage 3, “innovation-driven,” 
and consists of most of the developed world.  To determine the stage, multiple factors are 
considered including GDP per capita and pillars of economic and social progress 
(detailed in Chapter V).  Russia is trying to transform their country from a Stage 2 
“efficiency driven” country, into the final stage, a Stage 3 “innovation driven” 
economy.14  Russia has improved over the past 20 years, but is still classified as a Stage 2 
country.  This is largely due to the inheritance of a corrupt political system and 
socioeconomic structure that resulted after the fall of communism, which made it difficult 
to swiftly build sound institutions.  History shows that modernization is difficult in state-
run capitalistic countries where state institutions are weak and survive through corruptive 
                                                 
14 World Economic Fourm, Members of the Global Competitiveness Report Advisory Board, "The 
Global Competitiveness Report 2010–2011," (2010), 10.  
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2010-11.pdf. 
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means.  “Economic backwardness” is still very much alive in Russia, and these remnants 
from the Soviet economic system continue to contribute to the failure to fully modernize 
their economy.  Finally, Chapter VI will reflect on the results of the empirical data and 
offer recommendations for a successful outcome of Russian modernization plans. 
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II. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. AND EUROPE INTERESTS 
Economically, Russia plays a vital role in the global market.  As one of the 
members of the emerging market community, BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), 
Russia has experienced enormous growth in the past decade due to the rising demand for 
natural resources and large inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI).15  Russia’s growth 
of per capita income in the 2000s has caused wage inequality to decline, allowing the 
Russian middle class population to grow to historical highs.16  However, the 2008 global 
recession, along with the crash in the commodities market that followed, highlighted how 
fragile the Russian economy is, built primarily on a corrupt, state-managed commodities 
market.17  The global recession has forced the leadership of Russia to realize that they 
have arrived at a crossroads in determining Russia’s economic future.   
Even though it has declined in industrial and military power since the height of 
the Soviet Union, Russia still holds enormous global political and military influence.  As 
the largest country on Earth, and the only one with more natural resources than the 
United States,18 Russia’s political and military policies affect not only their neighbors, 
but the fragile “balance of power” in the world.   
In Russia’s “National Security Strategy 2020,” the Kremlin outlines a 
commitment to renew economic strength as one of its primary goals for the next decade.  
Russia’s current leadership wants to use its “resource potential to expand the possibilities 
of the Russian Federation to strengthen its influence on the world arena.”19  By analyzing 
the context of Russia’s economic modernization, one can understand the strategic vision 
                                                 
15 Xueli Wan, "FDI in BRICs,", Vol. 5Canadian Center of Science & Education, 2010), 168., 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=52159681&site=ehost-live&scope=site. 
16 Ibid., 171. 
17 Dmitri Trenin, "Russia's Conservative Modernization: A Mission Impossible?" SAIS Review 30, no. 
1 (Winter–Spring, 2010), 32. 
18 Library of Congress Wasington DC Congressional Research Service, Russian Political, Economic, 
and Security Issues and U.S. Interests Fields and Groups : 050300 - Economics and Cost Analysis 050400 
- Government and Political Science, Vol. Report Number(s): XJCRSD. 
19 Ibid., 18. 
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of the Kremlin, and its domestic and international goals for the future.  The United States 
has enormous national interests in the Eurasia region, and ensuring democratic stability 
and economic prosperity in Russia is a fundamental goal of U.S. foreign policy.  Recent 
rhetoric by President Medvedev could provide the U.S. with a valuable opportunity to 
assist in their economic modernization, which could result in future political 
liberalization.  Will Russia be able to overcome its historic culture of corruption, and set 
upon a radical economic liberalization that will create a more democratic Russia? 
The modernization program implemented by Medvedev requires economic and 
political support from outside resources, specifically Europe, U.S., and Asia.  Foreign 
direct investments from these countries remain a critical part of the process for 
technological improvement in Russia.  The West realizes the opportunity that faces them 
in regards to contributing and influencing economic and potentially political reforms in 
Russia.  There have been numerous ideas on the nature of the modernization effort and 
the steps that need to be completed for true reform.  One of the main beliefs, which stems 
from Putin and the old elitists, is that a strong state is vital to oversee economic reform.  
The other side, including Medvedev, views political reform as a part of the modernization 
process.  Medvedev and Putin are believed to hold differing views on the degree to which 
modernization should occur; Putin limits it at technological and innovative steps, while 
Medvedev wishes to extend it to a political and social sphere.20   
The European Union (EU) has been eagerly observing the modernization efforts 
since their inception in 2008, in hopes that true economic reform could allow for a shift 
from past interactions to a fresh renewal in their economic and political relationships.  In 
the recent summit in Rostov-on-Don, the EU and Russia formulated a “Joint Statement 
on the Partnership for Modernization” (P4M), which reflects the EU’s desire to have an 
influence in the direction of Moscow’s plans, while Russia is reaching out to garner 
increase in financial and political support.  The P4M is an economic forum between the 
EU and Russia that sets a common agenda for modernization, and established the start of 
cooperation on economic and social issues.  An EU press release from the summit stated, 
                                                 
20 Felix Krawatzek, The Same Old Modernisation Game? Russian Interpretations of Modernisation, 5. 
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“The agenda is ambitious and broad in scope, encompassing economic, social, 
environmental, and legal dimensions, which in itself will be a challenge.”21  While the 
P4M is primarily an economic forum to address concerns over business relations, it has 
the potential to become a more relevant tool in Russia’s economic modernization.  With 
the agreement, the EU has reached a consensus of the importance of Medvedev’s plan 
forward with economic modernization.  However, there remains deep skepticism within 
the EU on the exact magnitude of the reforms that will be implemented.  The EU favors a 
bottom-up approach that includes social and political reforms simultaneously, while the 
exact Russian goals remain unknown. 
The United States has already invested financial and political resources into the 
modernization efforts.  Many of the country’s most successful companies have 
contributed to the development of the state-run technology park outside of Moscow.  
While this is important for U.S. interests, the majority of its interests lay in the political 
ramifications for the current administrations’ policies with Russia and the Eurasia region.  
The U.S. holds an important opportunity in assisting Russia with its modernization 
efforts, as expressed by Obama’s recent remarks during Medvedev’s visit in June 2010.22  
The degree of the modernization assistance will impact the relationship with Russia and 
could heavily influence the alliance of NATO.  The U.S.-NATO position with Russia has 
been under strain since the Georgia conflict of 2008.  U.S. and Russian relations could 
improve as more open economic policies and financial and political support are received 
from the West.  The current stalemate regarding NATO membership could move toward 
the U.S. favor as the U.S. could use newly forged economic partnerships with Russia as 
collateral for the reopening of NATO talks with potential membership states. 
                                                 
21 Council of the European Union, Joint Statement on the Partnership for Modernisation, EU-Russia 
Summit, Rostov-on-Dov, June 1, 2010), 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/114747.pdf (accessed November 4, 
2010). 
22 The White House, "Statement by the Press Secretary on the Visit by President Medvedev of the 
Russian Federation to the White House," The White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/statement-press-secretary-visit-president-medvedev-russian-federation-white-house (accessed  
November 4, 2010). 
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The EU and U.S. both face a difficult balancing act in their policies toward 
Russia’s economic modernization.  If they demand a bottom-up approach through 
political and social reforms they could potentially ruin the unique opportunity in assisting 
radical economic reform.  If they take a mutually exclusive approach, separating political 
and economic reforms, it could strengthen the elite resistance within the Kremlin for 
reform.  This paper will analyze Russia’s reluctance for reform, based upon its two 
hurdles that continually present the biggest challenge for modernization, corruption and 
energy dependence.  Understanding of the nature of their challenge can better provide 
evidence of what effective political and economic policies from the EU and U.S. will 
contribute to a more democratic and prosperous Russia. 
A. EUROPEAN UNION AND U.S. ASSISTANCE TO MODERNIZATION 
The United States has been waiting for an opportunity to assist Russia in 
liberalizing its economic and political structures.  Some in the U.S. believe the time has 
finally come with President Medvedev’s modernization plan.  Multiple U.S. corporations 
have already begun to invest financial resources into the ongoing modernization efforts 
through the U.S.-Russia Business Council (USRBC).  The USRBC  held its 18th annual 
meeting titled “From Silicon Valley to Skolkovo: Forging Innovation Partnerships” in 
October 2010 in San Francisco, where Russian leaders met with representatives from 
Silicon Valley corporations to discuss long term partnerships in economic development.  
While this is important for U.S. and Russian economic interests, the majority of U.S. 
interests lay in promoting political liberalization at the same time.  
The U.S. holds an important opportunity in assisting Russia with its 
modernization efforts through international integration, as expressed by Obama’s remarks 
during Medvedev’s visit to Washington D.C. in June 2010.23  “Russia belongs in the 
WTO that's good for Russia, it's good for America and it's good for the world 
economy.”24  The impact of the modernization assistance from the U.S. could allow 
                                                 
23 The White House, Statement by the Press Secretary on the Visit by President Medvedev of the 
Russian Federation to the White House. 
24 Kumar Sen Ashish, "Obama Encourages Russia's Entry into WTO; Medvedev Agrees to Allow 
Resumption of Poultry Exports," The Washington Times, Sec. A, POLITICS, June 25, 2010. 
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Russia to become more aligned with the interests of the West, and create a chance for the 
U.S. to use its economic support to persuade Russia to promote U.S. foreign policy goals.  
Additionally, while the U.S. realizes its inability to directly affect political reform in 
Russia, economic assistance can provide the West with a valuable tool to spur Russian 
economic growth and potentially lead to future political reform in Russia.   
The U.S.-NATO relationship with Russia has been under strain since the Georgia 
conflict of 2008.  But in November 2010, Russia attended the NATO Lisbon summit, the 
second NATO-Russian meeting since the Georgia war ended.  Some see an 
unprecedented shift in alignment to the West, with President Medvedev’s agreement to 
participate in the NATO-led European missile defense system.25  However, others 
interpret these actions as an indication that Moscow will undertake an “arms race” with 
NATO unless NATO agrees to Russia’s terms on missile defense.  The U.S. and EU 
could use this new partnership to facilitate additional integration of Russia into the West.  
This softening of Russian foreign policy internationally could hopefully be a sign of a 
shift in domestic issues as well.  The U.S.-Russian partnership in modernization could 
assist other areas of their relations, such as with ongoing regional issues involving 
European missile defense, Georgia, and NATO expansion.  Internationally, Russia’s 
support is vital in passing UN Security Council resolutions against countries participating 
in weapon proliferation, such as Iran and North Korea.   
The EU and the U.S. both face a difficult balancing act in their policies toward 
Russia’s economic modernization.  One thing is clear, recent actions from Moscow 
indicate a unique opportunity for the West to help facilitate Russian modernization, and 
also help cultivate an unprecedented relationship between Russian and U.S. national 
security interests.  To better understand the correct balance of assistance and reform from 
the West, the challenges facing Russia must be addressed. 
 
                                                 
25 No Author, "Place for Russia in Nuclear Shield," The Sunday Mail (Queensland, Australia), sec. 
WORLD, November 21, 2010.; Christi Parsons, Paul Richter and Sergei L. Loiko, "NATO Plans Missile 
Defense Shield; Allies Say They're Optimistic Russia Will Help Build the System Aimed at Protecting 
Europe and the U.S." Los Angeles Times, sec. MAIN NEWS; Foreign Desk; Part A, November 20, 2010. 
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III. CORRUPTION IN RUSSIA 
A. RUSSIA’S BARRIERS FOR MODERNIZATION 
To fully understand the nature of the present day challenge of modernization in 
Russia, the analysis must reflect back on the studies about the origins of “administrative 
weakness,” or corruption, in economic development.  Corruption, as defined by the 
World Bank, is “the abuse of public power for private benefit.”26  Russia was initially 
faced with weak political and economic structures in the early 1990s, so the government 
took a more active role in the economy.  Political scientist Kiren Chaudhry identifies the 
origins of state-managed economies as follows, “Government ownership is more often a 
response to the administrative weakness of the state in developing countries rather than a 
reaction to the private sector’s inability to provide the skills and capital necessary for 
bulky investments.”27  Throughout the 1990s, the Russian state filled in the economic 
voids from the transition to democracy, which brought about “rent-seeking” or corruptive 
transactions that facilitated the weakness of economic institutions. 
This “rent-seeking” corruption is just one of the variables to eliminate in the 
modernization process in Russia.  Even though corruption cannot be eliminated 
completely in any state, it still must be reduced to a level that does not hinder economic 
development.  Most developed nations had to confront their respective corrupt economic 
systems early on in their modernization process.  Many of the ex-communist countries in 
Eastern Europe, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, have made great progress in this 
area by implementing Western reforms in their markets through membership in the EU or 
 
                                                 
26 Vito Tanzi, "Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures," Staff Papers 
- International Monetary Fund 45, no. 4 (December 1998), pp. 559–594, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3867585. 
27 Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, "The Myth of the Market and the Common History of Late Developers," 




WTO.  Economic progress will not happen in Russia without substantial commitment 
from the government to improve other areas that are lacking such as the rule of law, 
property rights, and the business environment.  There are many beliefs on the exact role 
the government should play in the modernization efforts, and to what extent they should 
reform other areas of socioeconomic system.   
1. Differing Views on Modernization 
Russia’s degree of corruption has remained higher than the rest of the ex-
communist countries due to the inheritance of the Soviet state-run economy.  The size 
and scope of the Soviet economy made the transition to a completely free market more 
difficult than in other ex-communist states.  Russia’s energy dependent economy also 
contributed to the ability of the state to control the market and stifle any innovation or 
creativity that remained.  Putin’s centralization of the economic and political structures in 
the early 2000s created additional dependence on these informal networks.  Putin 
consolidated multiple areas of the political system in order to foster his one-party rule 
with United Russia.  He amended laws allowing the majority of government postings to 
be appointed by the President or his staff, acquired control of almost all media by state 
ownership, and weakened the independence of the courts and the rule of law.  During his 
presidency, Putin seems to have solidified some of the same corrupt structures that 
Medvedev is ostensibly trying to overcome.  As Dmitri Trenin states, “Of course, 
corruption was not born in Russia on Putin’s watch; neither was strong state dependency 
on energy and raw materials, but the rent-seeking bureaucracy that has virtually 
overtaken the state is a phenomenon of the last decade.”28   
There have been numerous ideas on the nature of the modernization effort and the 
steps that need to be completed for true reform in Russia.  In Moscow, there are 
competing parties in defining the direction of the modernization effort.  Most of them 
agree that Russia is too dependent on energy resources and that it is losing its 
competitiveness in the global economy.   
                                                 
28 Dmitri Trenin, "Russia's Conservative Modernization: A Mission Impossible?" SAIS Review 30, no. 
1 (Winter–Spring, 2010), 28. 
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The first group of reformers is made up of the “liberal modernizers,” who wish to 
see not only economic reforms, but political reforms as well.  Medvedev and his 
economic advisors, along with some Russian intellectuals, are largely in this group.  They 
seek to integrate the Russian economy into the global market by reaching out to the West 
through economic and political policies.  They “want to do three things: upgrade Russia's 
dilapidated infrastructure and rusting industrial base; diversify Russia's economy away 
from over-reliance on oil and gas exports via state-funded development of various high 
tech industries; and, crucially, to undertake political reforms at some medium-term 
point.”29  
This group is faced with an enormous challenge from an elite class, “hard-line 
reformers,” that make up the primary structure of Putin’s centralized power base.  This 
group consists of Putin and the old elites, who believe that a strong state is vital to 
oversee economic reform.  Contrastly to the hard liners, the liberal reformers view 
political reform as a part of the process.  A few laws passed by Medvedev indicate 
modest progress in political reform, but the level required for the radical modernization 
that Russia needs is not complete.   
2. Medvedev Takes Steps Toward Modernization 
Recent actions by Medvedev have given some optimism to the ongoing debate on 
the seriousness of the modernization effort.  For example, Skolkovo Park, as previously 
mentioned.  Skolkovo or “Innovation City” is planned to be a center for business and 
engineering innovation.  While able to attract businesses and universities to the Skolkovo 
Park, Russia is still deficient in many other areas of its economy, preventing it from 
transitioning to the next level of economic development.  Critics of the innovation park 
point out that Russia is not developing the vital bottom-up approach to modernization.  
Vladimir Babkin, an expert at the State Duma's committee for science and technology, 
noted, "Silicon Valley in California was created on the basis of universities.  It was a 
                                                 
29 Alexander Kliment, "Can Russia Make Modernization Work?" Foreign Policy, 
http://eurasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/10/29/can_russia_make_modernization_work_in_the_21st_cen
tury (accessed November 4, 2010). 
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bottom-up growth.  In Russia, it is top down, and the goals are unclear."30  The deficient 
areas that need to be addressed in Russia will continue to plague the modernization 
efforts unless action is taken.  Russia continues to remain in the bottom of the category 
for European nations in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, a 
dismal 63rd place.31  In the Transparency International Corruption Index, Russia ranked 
at 146th in 2009.32  These rankings remain dominant areas of concern for foreign 
investors and Western leaders who desire a more democratic Russia. 
Medvedev has taken some steps to combat corruption in Russia, but the impact of 
these laws is not yet realized, and these laws have not resulted in any recent drop in 
corruption rankings.  In July 2008, Medvedev signed the National Anti Corruption Plan, 
and in April 2010 the corresponding National Strategy for Combating Corruption.  These 
plans outline compliance to the Council of Europe’s Group of Countries against 
Corruption (GRECO), which will align international standards to Russian practices.  It is 
hoped that external support through this international organization can assist Russia in 
battling corruption.  It is premature to realize the exact benefits of the anti-corruption 
laws, but these efforts are a signal that Russia is trying to further integrate by complying 
with international corruption standards.  Analysts estimate that Russia loses 300 billion 
(U.S. dollars) a year in corrupt practices.33  Embarrassingly, Russia is the most corrupt 
G-20 nation, and Medvedev hopes that a renewal in economic investment in the country, 
through properly allocated foreign direct investment (FDI), will assist in the process of 
defeating rampant corruption.34 
                                                 
30 David Kramer, "Modernizing Russia's Economy...and Politics," Foreign Policy, 
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/24/modernizing_russia_s_economy_and_politics (accessed 
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B. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) AND CORRUPTION 
The modernization program implemented by Medvedev requires economic and 
political support from outside resources, specifically Europe, U.S., and Asia.  Foreign 
direct investments from these countries remain a critical part of the process for 
technological improvement in Russia.  However, studies have shown that high levels of 
corruption prevent foreign direct investment.35  This is because corruption increases the 
uncertainty of investors and acts as a hidden cost in business transactions.  Alvaro 
Cuervo-Cazurra in “Who Cares about Corruption?” states, “It acts as an irregular tax on 
business, increasing costs, and distorting incentives to invest.”36  Other studies report, 
however, that low levels of corruption act as a catalyst in business transactions by 
speeding up the regular slow movement of foreign investments into internal markets.37 
However, Russia’s FDI inflows throughout the 2000s contradict the thesis that 
high levels of corruption prevent FDI.  Russia experienced high levels of FDI inflows 
even though it ranked in the highest levels of corruption in the region and the world 
throughout the 2000s.38  Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra also states, “Investors are not created 
equal.”39  In fact, investors from countries with high levels of corruption are more likely 
to invest in countries with high levels of corruption.  In contrast, countries that have laws 
against investing in corrupt states show lower levels of investment.40  Despite these high 
levels of investment, FDI in Russia was not authorized in many controlled sectors, thus 
degrading chances for economic growth in these areas. 
                                                 
35 Aparna Mathur and Kartikeya Singh, "Foreign Direct Investment, Corruption, and Democracy," 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (May 15, 2007), 
http://www.aei.org/publication26180. 
36 Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, "Who Cares about Corruption?" Journal of International Business Studies 
37, no. 6, Three Lenses on the Multinational Enterprise: Politics, Corruption and Corporate Social 
Responsibility (November 2006), 807-822, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4540385. 
37 Ibid., 808. 
38 Russia: Investors to Remain Wary, 16-16. 
39 Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares about Corruption?, 807–822. 
40 Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares about Corruption?, 807–822. 
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Even though levels of FDI in Russia in the past decade have been impressive, 
Russia has missed out on vast investments in deteriorating sectors.  One of the criteria for 
the modernization effort is to allow access into new sectors for foreign investors.  
Therefore, Russia needs to lower the restrictions on foreign direct investment into all its 
economic sectors.  Eastern European countries were able to attract more FDI than Russia 
during the time period of 1997–2005, due to their integration into the West through 
membership in the EU and acceptance of liberal democratic standards, which promoted 
foreign investment.  Russia placed eleventh out of eighteen countries in this time 
period.41  During the 1990s, the U.S. was the largest contributor of FDI to Russia, 
reaching a peak of 30.6 percent in 1999.42  However, during the 2000s, other states, most 
notably western European states, began to make larger investments in Russia, decreasing 
the U.S. amount to less than five percent.43  One reason why Russia lags behind other 
Eastern European states in economic development is that it still controls many portions of 
the economy through state-managed companies.  Russia continues to control which 
sectors are open to investors, notably: natural resources, infrastructure, defense, media, 
and monopolies.44  The passing of the 2008 Strategic Enterprise Law further tightened 
the sectors to which investors could direct their capital inflows.  This lost capital could 
have been used to innovate or invest in improvements in Russian companies, leading to 
higher consumption and GDP per capita.  Russia could experience even more FDI 
inflows once corruption is controlled, leading to further economic and political 
integration.   
Recently, the Russian leadership has taken steps to begin to privatize many areas 
of the economy.  Between 2011 and 2013, Russia is set to privatize up to 50 billion in 
sales of assets in multiple Russian state-run corporations.45  These actions will increase 
                                                 
41 Yi Feng, Yi Sun and Joshua C. Walton, "Foreign Direct Investment in Russia and Lessons for 
China," Chinese Economy 42, no. 3 (May 2009), 84., 
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43 Ibid., 84. 
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the role of private investors in state corporations and could lead to diminishing corrupt 
practices in informal networks.  International investors play a crucial role in defining the 
strength of the future Russian economy.  International institutions can also assist with 
these measures to facilitate a complete and fair transition. 
C. EXTERNAL REFORMS WITH INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION  
The beginning of international integration for Russia could be accomplished 
through the completion of its membership in the WTO.  The WTO requires multiple 
levels of adherence to anti-corruption and property protection laws, which could foster 
external support to invest in Russia’s corrupt economy.  Studies have shown international 
integration as critical in determining the level of corruption.  Sandholtz and Gray, in their 
study of 153 countries, found that international organizations (IOs) act against corruption 
via two forces, economic and norms.46  These external forces contribute to a state’s 
ability to fight corruptive practices in political and economic systems.  “The more a 
country is tied into international networks of exchange, communication, and 
organization, the lower its level of corruption is likely to be.”47  In addition to the WTO, 
other IOs, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, provide 
rules and regulations that contribute to the economic forces that fight corruption.  The 
second force that international organizations provide to work against corruption is 
“norms,” or standards to combat the corruptive nature of the state’s society.  Russia has 
resisted some of the international integration that has occurred in the recent decades, due 
to the independent political and economic nature of the Russian culture.  Recently, 
however, these external forces appear to be gaining traction in Russia as some realize the 
importance of international integration in its economic modernization.  The EU’s P4M, 
the USRBC, and Russia’s pending WTO membership represent the beginning of a new 
era for international economic cooperation with Russia.  With international integration, 
Russia may find itself more willing to accept Western norms in its economic sphere.  
                                                 
46 Wayne Sandholtz and Mark M. Gray, "International Integration and National Corruption," 
International Organization 57, no. 4 (Autumn 2003), pp. 761–800, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3594846. 
47 Ibid. 
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These norms could contribute to strengthening the relatively poor structure of the 
institutions inside the socioeconomic system within Russia.  When a country is integrated 
into the international market multiple instruments begin to increase their presence in the 
domestic sphere.  However, external forces are insufficient if domestic actions are not 
taken in the same manner.  Corruption in Russia should be addressed simultaneously in 
both international and domestic arenas.   
D. INTERNAL REFORMS TOWARD MODERNIZATION 
There are two approaches in Russia’s modernization efforts, and they revolve 
around either a bottom-up approach or a top-down approach.  Many Western leaders 
realize that demanding initial political reforms inside Russia within the current 
environment is not realistic.  These demands could backfire and harden the political 
regime’s resistance to undertaking future potential reforms.  Instead, the hopes of the 
Western contributors in assisting Russia are that economic assistance will lead to 
prosperity in new areas, causing economic prosperity for a new middle class.  Economic 
prosperity is shown to lower levels of corruption.48  “The logic is that discount rates of 
potential bribe takers and bribe givers are lower in wealthier nations, making them less 
eager to engage in corrupt practices.”49  The prosperity of a new middle class in Russia 
could slowly erode the power base away from the elite class, and the new middle class 
could demand political liberalization over the long term. 
Some believe that Medvedev’s modernization effort is an idealistic venture that 
might not result in any substantial political reforms.  However, one must acknowledge 
the impact that economic growth has upon democracy.  It is unclear whether democracy 
can be successfully developed before economic prosperity.  Sun and Johnston indicate 
that the promotion of economic development through reform and international integration 
result in a better foundation for governance reform in the future.  “For corruption control 
and for governance more broadly, success is more likely if an economic base is built first, 
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with democracy following more gradually.”50  Economic prosperity through international 
integration is the first step needed in modernizing Russia, which could lead to political 
reforms in the future. 
E. A NEW RUSSIA? 
The U.S. and the EU each have contributions to make in the modernization effort; 
both private and public institutions can integrate Russia’s economy, which will indirectly 
assist Russia in making much needed political reforms.  To reach this goal of political 
reform, a Russian democracy rich with institutions to facilitate the proper balance of 
political and economic power is crucial in the modernization process.  As Sun and 
Johnston state, two areas are central in creating imbalances in corrupt economies.  
“Balance between the accessibility and autonomy of political elites…and balance of 
political and economic opportunities” are the fundamental causes of corruption.51   
An explanation of the imbalance seen in Russian society stems from the failure to 
create the necessary institutions for Russian citizens.  As ex-communist states sought 
integration into Europe and became part of the New Europe, Russian elites resisted in 
following along the same path.  In the early 1990s, there was a window available to the 
West to contribute to the complete transformation of Russia’s economic and political 
structure.  The new Russia was dependent upon financial and political support from the 
U.S. in the early years of Yelstin’s rule in Moscow, hypothetically allowing Washington 
great influence in the design of early Russia.  However, this influence was short lived.  
As Lilia Shevtsova points out, “In truth, all Western leaders made two grave errors: First, 
they relied on Yeltsin and believed that he would guarantee Russia’s transition; second, 
they emphasized the economy while neglecting to push for political reform.”52  The West 
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hesitated in including Russia in this process due to remnants of Cold War attitudes, and 
the inherent nature of the design of the new Russian Federation.   
The resistance to modernization in Russia is composed of a population that 
receives its authority through the vertical power structure of the government.  The key for 
Russian liberal reformers and the West is to give the Russian elites that are so opposed to 
political reform virtually no other option than to follow the forces of international and 
domestic economic re-alignment.  This can be done by the government raising the 
incentives for economic cooperation and taking measures to lowering the incentives and 
raising the costs for past illegal practices.  The West needs to give economic assistance to 
the modernization efforts in order to increase the growth of the Russian economy.  
Evidence shows that economic growth leads to lower levels of corruption.53  While 
financial constraints are present in most developed nations, there are measures available 
to assist Russia without great monetary investment, including economic forums and 
supporting Russian entrance into the WTO.   
Much debate has been given to the degree to which the West should assist in 
Russian economic modernization.  Medvedev and Russia’s liberal reformers should 
actively pursue economic integration with its Western peers, and begin to isolate the 
opposing hard-line reformers.  Medvedev’s liberal reformers could distance themselves 
from the old elite and, through economic prosperity, legitimize their policies, leading to a 
bottom-up reform in the political and social spheres.  There is resistance to the reforms 
from within Russia and the Western world.  Western analysts will continue to state that 
the long term goals of Medvedev and Putin remain unknown, and that Russia will 
continue to remain Russia.  However, this is not sufficient evidence for the West to 
abandon assisting the liberal reformers in this crucial window of opportunity.    
Private corporations are beginning to realize the importance of the Russian 
market, and have contributed millions of dollars to the innovation park in Skolkovo.54  
But, private industry support alone will not achieve the outcome of radical modernization 
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so desired in the West.  Radical modernization will require a multi-facet approach from 
international actors, specifically the European Union and the United States.  The 
European Union is in a historic position to assist Russia in its efforts to become more of a 
part of “New Europe.”  Further economic integration into the European and global 
markets could act as a catalyst for economic reforms that one day could initiate political 
reforms.  The P4M is a vital vehicle to allow for active participation in this process, and 
must be strengthened further for greater results.   
U.S. participation through the USRBC should adopt a similar agreement as the 
EU, and develop a “U.S.-Russian Partnership for Modernization.”  This agreement could 
act as a supplement to the EU’s P4M and offer the “liberal modernizers” the much 
needed financial and political support from abroad.  Increases in FDI into new Russian 
sectors through these partnerships can only reduce the resistance from the Russian elite 
and allow for further political liberalization.  U.S. support for Russian membership in the 
WTO should become a top priority of the Obama administration, since economic 
integration with the West is the first step in promoting political reform in the future.  The 
WTO is currently under a seventeen year review of Russian membership, but recent 
events signal that complete membership could be granted in the near future.  U.S. support 
for Russia’s modernization will further align Russian interests with those of the U.S., and 
build upon the “reset” of foreign policy relations between the two countries.  The U.S. 
could use the new partnership to garner Russian support for critical foreign policy 
objectives through United Nations Security Council resolutions.  The U.S. and Europe 
missed the window of opportunity to assist in Russia’s modernization in the early 1990s.  
Today, both have unique roles in completing the integration of Russia into New Europe, 
but if hesitation occurs, owing to Cold War attitudes, and prevents action from the West, 










IV. RUSSIA’S “OIL CURSE?”  
A. ENERGY DEPENDENCE AND RUSSIA’S MODERNIZATION 
Since the formation of the Russian Federation nearly twenty years ago, Russia’s 
economy has depended mostly on natural resources within a “rent-seeking” environment 
that is burdened with illegal practices, including “bribery, corruption, smuggling, and 
black markets.”55  Russian economic dependence on natural resources became ever more 
apparent in the decade of the 2000s.  In this decade, political and economic success was 
directly related to the high price of energy commodities, often solidifying the corrupt 
economic system.  The “oil curse”56 continually contributes to the failure of the economy 
to innovate and to become competitive with the global economy.  The Russian 
government hopes that new economic reforms and projects will erode these barriers to 
innovation and shift Russia’s dependence away from natural resources towards a future 
Russia driven by technological development.57   
The Skolkovo Project, a state-sponsored science park emulating California’s 
Silicon Valley, is just one of the many initiatives the Kremlin is undertaking to revitalize 
the Russian economy.58  This chapter will focus on one of the priorities of President 
Medvedev in pursuing economic modernization: overcoming a “primitive economy based 
on raw materials.”59  There are many internal and external obstacles to economic 
diversification.  Internally, Russia’s economic and political system reinforces the energy-
based economy, where energy rents are used as means to achieve greater economic and 
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political power.  Externally, Russia relies strongly on its ability to use energy exports as a 
tool for promoting certain foreign policy goals.  Russian relationships with European and 
Central Asian countries are tense at best, since many of them rely solely on Russia for 
energy imports.  Russia recently announced interest in overcoming its historic 
dependence on energy and starting out on a path for an innovation economy.  The 
modernization plan could alter the relationships dominated by these states’ dependencies 
on Russian energy resources, and become an opportunity to partner in future economic 
and energy agreements.  Often these European countries have more advanced 
manufacturing and technology based sectors that could offer Russia an ideal incentive for 
cooperation, where both countries could largely benefit.  Europe and Russia, through 
economic modernization partnerships, can help foster a stronger mutual relationship that 
can decrease the Kremlin’s use of oil as a foreign diplomatic tool, and can establish more 
open and secure energy and economic policies.  To achieve these benefits, these countries 
will have to increase their investments in Russia, allowing capital-inflows/energy-
outflows to become the uniting bond in their relationship.  Russia can start to break down 
its historic dependence on energy by pursuing a multi-faceted approach that includes 
fostering business partnerships in non-energy sectors through investment by 
implementing a massive privatization program, and agreeing to an EU-Russia energy 
policy which will benefit both actors, lowering the chance of future energy crises in 
Europe, and create a more prosperous and secure Eurasia region.   
B. THE OIL CURSE DILEMMA 
Russia’s economic and political strength is achieved through its control of vast 
energy resources.  Throughout the past twenty years, efforts by the government to 
consolidate control over the energy sectors were hostile, causing the West to reach the 
consensus that Russia was heading in the wrong direction with respect to democracy.  
However, during the past two years some Russian officials have begun to take steps to 
change the dynamics of the Russian economy away from energy, by focusing on building 
Russia’s capacity for a new innovative and technology-based economy.  The main 
dilemma that Russia faces is: should it pursue a complete liberalization of its economic 
policies, which in turn would cause short term volatility in the market and possible 
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political crises?  The liberalization path would probably increase foreign investment into 
all sectors through privatization efforts.  It would also lessen the government’s control of 
the energy-based economy, which would force the Russian elites to lose their leverage 
over domestic issues as well as energy dependent countries’ foreign policies.  The second 
path, which is regarded as highly probable by the majority of Western analysts, is that 
Russia will maintain the status-quo by failing to adopt substantial reforms, thus missing 
the economic transformation that could possibly come with integration into the global 
economy and still remain subject to the “oil curse.”  According to Celeste Wallander,  
In the modern world, no country can aspire to prosperity or greatness by 
isolating itself from globalization, especially if, like Russia, its economic 
base requires exports.  If Russia wishes to be a wealthy great power, it is 
going to have to participate in the globalized international system.60   
There are benefits for both Russia and Europe in economic modernization.  To 
fully grasp the benefits, the factors that influence economic modernization must be 
analyzed within the realm of the international system.  The external and internal factors 
that contribute to the energy-based economy remained locked in a cyclical dependence, 
but in the long term effective policy reforms can erode the energy dependence inside 
Russia.  There remain many unknowns, such as, how would Russia respond to adjusting 
its dependency on energy through economic modernization, a dependency which dictates 
its economic and political power in the world?   
C. EUROPE AND U.S. INTERESTS, EXTERNAL FACTORS IN 
MODERNIZATION 
Both Russia and Europe have a great interest in their energy and economic 
relations, and through a new approach of mutual economic assistance, both can achieve 
mutual economic and energy prosperity.  The European Union and the U.S. have 
immense interests in assisting Russia in overcoming its dependence on energy.  European 
relations with Russia over energy have remained fragile and tense, and have been held 
hostage by their dependence on Russian supplied energy.   
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Russia holds an enormous amount of leverage over the European countries with 
its vast energy exports into the continent.  The EU depends on Russia for 30 percent of its 
oil imports and 50 percent of its natural gas imports.61  Not only does Russia dictate the 
energy prices, but Russia uses this leverage to promote political goals in the region.  
Throughout the 2000s, Moscow used energy tactics to punish or reward states in its 
periphery and exert influence on political and regional issues.  These states often have no 
option other then to accept Russian political demands and high prices of commodities.  If 
they resist, the commodity prices are either adjusted upward or supplies are immediately 
cut off, which results in their population literally freezing.   
Russian energy policies have been instrumental in building resistance for some 
states’ participation in NATO’s Membership Action Plan, notably Georgia and Ukraine.  
The Ukraine natural gas crises of 2006 and 2009 are perfect examples of the type of 
energy politics Moscow plays in the region.  Gazprom, the powerful state-controlled 
energy company, usually acts as the main culprit in carrying out Moscow’s political 
agenda.  The EU has voiced great concern over the recent activities of the “energy war.”  
Its concern is likely to grow since its demand for natural gas is projected to only rise in 
the future.  According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) Reference Scenario 
(2008), the demand for gas imports within the European Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) bloc will increase from 46 percent in 2006 to 69 
percent by 2030.62  Additionally, a long reliable natural gas field in the North Sea has 
begun to dry up, leaving Europe looking east for other suppliers.63  Also, European 
energy production peaked in 2008, and a continual decline will see European energy 
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production meeting a quarter of its demand by 2025.64  Due to the growing demand in 
Europe, past energy crises with Russia, and the recent agreement to assist Russia through 
the Partnership for Modernization Plan (P4M), it is vital for the EU to use this 
opportunity to develop an energy policy with Russia to reach an optimal solution for its 
future energy needs. 
A recent study revealed that both Europe and Russia lose out when Russia cuts 
energy supplies, and that it is in the interests of both to cooperate on energy 
agreements.65  When Russia seems to become unreliable, Europe seeks other import 
contracts, leading Russia to lose out on potential profits, and thus having to lower its 
price to recoup lost contracts.  Therefore, when Russia defaults on energy supplies to 
Europe, it loses out on market share and faces price decreases.66  Conversely, European 
states pay enormous surpluses to Russia and are at constant risk of potential stoppage.  It 
follows that both Europe and Russia seek to gain from future economic partnerships that 
will undoubtedly lower the likelihood of future energy crises.   
While energy policy is a sensitive topic among EU states, the majority of these 
states realize that they are hostage to Russia’s energy exports.  They see Russia acting out 
a “divide and conquer strategy” in the region by purchasing foreign energy companies 
with the intent to control the price and deliverability.  There is no denying that the EU is 
currently trying to construct a common energy policy to deal with energy security issues 
in the East, but the task is complex.  The farther east in Europe one goes, the more 
countries become dependent on Russia.  “No fewer than seven eastern European 
countries receive at least 90 percent of their crude oil imports from Russia, and six EU 
nations are entirely dependent on Russia for their natural gas imports.”67  Some see the 
current situation as an indirect threat to European security and proof of the need for the 
EU to adopt a comprehensive energy policy.  Energy policy reforms outlined in the 2007 
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European Parliament report were overwhelmingly approved, but these recommendations 
were largely ignored by the European Council and Commission.  This was mostly due to 
the fact that European Union nations are divided over adopting a common energy policy, 
which could potentially diminish their ability to control domestic energy decisions.  
Solutions have been proposed: the EU needs to develop a strategic energy storage system, 
build pipelines to other regional suppliers, and invest in energy alternatives.  
The EU, with U.S. support, has pursued multiple projects to lessen the 
dependence of Europe on Russia’s energy imports.  These projects include building 
pipelines into Central Asia that give these countries direct political and economic 
connections to Europe, while at the same time allowing Europe to lessen its dependence 
on Russia.  Some completed projects consist of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil 
pipeline, the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), and ongoing projects include, the Turkey-
Greece-Italy pipeline (TGI), and a major project from Turkey across Bulgaria, Romania, 
and Hungary and into Austria, known as Nabucco.  All these efforts will only slightly 
diminish Europe’s dependence on Russian energy, therefore additional actions are 
needed.  The EU needs to utilize the P4M, and use it to propose a bilateral agreement 
with the EU and Russia for a clear energy policy, in exchange for the EU’s ongoing 
support for Russia’s modernization efforts. 
The U.S., while not as dependent on Russian energy commodities as Europe, still 
holds important national security interests with many of the energy dependent countries, 
and continues to support their political and economic independence from Russia.  The 
U.S. has tried to lower these states’ dependence on Russian energy supplies through the 
support of multiple pipelines that divert Europe’s dependence to Central Asia around 
Russia.  The U.S. should assist the EU in developing an EU-Russia energy policy that 
will contribute to the stability and prosperity in the region. 
D. MEDVEDEV AND PUTIN, INTERNAL POLITICAL DEPENDENCE 
President Medvedev realizes the importance energy plays in Russia’s economy.  
Without energy and mineral exports Russia would not be able to project its political will 
on its neighbors or hold one of the dominating positions in the region.  Even though the 
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importance of natural resources is acknowledged by Medvedev, he still sees his country 
as desperately backward, relying on a decades old industrial-energy based economy.  In 
his 2009 article titled “Go Russia!”  Medvedev stated that “Twenty years of tumultuous 
change has not spared our country from its humiliating dependence on raw materials.”68  
Just as Russia depends on energy to exert its influence abroad, internally it also uses 
energy power (revenue) to eliminate and consolidate political actors.  So, what does 
Medvedev’s speech and his current modernization plan mean for the future of Russia’s 
energy dependent economy?   
The beginning of Russian intervention in the private energy market started with 
the Yukos affair in 2003.  Putin sought to stifle a long time rival and to regain control of 
the energy market by nationalizing the Yukos Corporation.  As Scott Barnes points out 
on the Yukos affair, “In addition, it revealed the state’s intent to concentrate much of its 
attention on the energy sector both as an engine of economic growth and as a potential 
tool for foreign policy.”69  In the next few years, Putin used the state-managed energy 
sector to bring about some economic development.  Large revenues from the high prices 
of commodities allowed Putin some degree of flexibility in pursuing his goal of state-led 
modernization.   
However, after the financial crises of 2008, Putin and the oil elites began to see 
the need for further economic development in additional sectors.  Medvedev and Putin 
both treasure the state-managed companies that use natural gas and oil as a political and 
economic weapon in the region.  Medvedev with recent actions may be slowly shifting 
away from Russia’s peak involvement in the private sector in 2004.  Medvedev believes 
that external investments are crucial for innovation and creativity to return to Russia.  In 
his economic liberalization effort some believe that Medvedev hopes that external 
support will force the political elite, whom he cannot control, into a cost-benefit analysis 
allowing him a chance at reform.  As Wallander states, “As the stakes for Russia rise in 
foreign investment and trade, the cost-benefit ratio of hegemonic or imperialistic 
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strategies in the definition of Russian national interests and the developments of its 
foreign and security policies will change in favor of liberalization.”70  This outcome is 
still far away for Russia, as the efforts to transition its economy forward into new sectors 
are crucial for the cost-benefit ratio to become relevant to liberalization. 
E. IMPLICATIONS FOR RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC ISSUES  
Russia has used its enormous revenues from the commodity boom to fund many 
domestic social programs.  These programs are beneficial to the citizens and maintain the 
state’s legitimacy in their eyes.  Recent reports indicate that over 40 percent of Russia’s 
government budget revenues are from the oil and gas sectors.71  Using the revenues for 
Russia’s transformation in other competitive sectors is consistent with the “mobilization” 
strategy, which states that these strengths are “the most obvious way to move from an 
extractive economy to the production of high-tech products that are competitive in the 
international market.”72  The “mobilization” strategy is preferred by Putin, and is the one 
with least risks to the Russian political structure. 
The West and liberal intellectuals in Russia hope for a radical “modernization” 
strategy that calls for the creation of sound institutions that can support the process of 
transformation.  The main risk for the modernization plan is that it comes with many 
short term costs.  In the short term, the modernization process severely depletes the 
socioeconomic system and therefore causes resistance at multiple levels.  This is why 
support from all levels of a state is crucial for modernization.  During the short term (2-3 
years), there is large volatility in the degree of support for the plan, such as overcoming 
political forces that have become entrenched during years of “rent-seeking.”  To 
accomplish this plan, a total shift in relations between the government and private sectors 
is needed.  As Shastitko, Afontsev, and Plaksin states, “In fact, the whole style of the 
authorities’ interrelations with civil society must be changed; government agencies will 
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have to become more accountable to citizens; and officials, more responsible for their 
actions (or inactions).”73  Some pessimistic critics claim that Russia is doomed by the 
symptoms and characteristic features of the “natural resource curse” or “Dutch disease.”  
Some of these traits are present in the Russian economy, but evidence from other states 
that have overcome similar conditions of dependence offers hope and model solutions for 
Russia to escape its curse. 
F. NATURAL RESOURCE CURSE AND DUTCH DISEASE? 
The literature on state energy dependence and its effects on the economy has been 
evolving from the first studies on the “natural resource curse.”  The Sachs and Warner 
study in 1995 was instrumental in promoting the belief that countries with large energy 
resources experienced low levels of economic growth.74  In recent years, Russia has 
experienced high levels of economic growth which would appear to refute Sachs and 
Warner’s theory of the “natural resource curse.”  During the period from 1999 to the 
2008 financial crises, the Russian economy grew at an impressive annual rate of 7-8 
percent GDP in real terms.75  This economic growth was due to the rise in global energy 
prices, most notably the increase in the price of crude oil, from 10 USD per barrel in 
1999 to 140 USD in 2008.76   
Many of the findings in the “natural resource curse” literature conclude that 
energy dependence causes a “crowding-out logic: an abundance of or heavy dependence 
on natural resources crowds out some activity ‘x’ which is thought to be growth-
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enhancing.”77  This is also known as the “Dutch disease,” a term which was invented by 
economists Corden and Neary in reaction to the Netherlands’ economic crisis in 1957 
after the Dutch discovered large natural gas deposits and experienced a decrease in 
economic development.  They argued that a “resource movement effect and spending 
effect” take place in a resource-driven economy that experiences a boom in growth.78  
This reality gives rise to macroeconomic forces that shift capital to the energy sector, 
diminishing the manufacturing and service sectors in conjunction with the rise of a single 
“monoexport” of energy.79   
Some believe that Russia is exhibiting the traits of “Dutch disease,” such as high 
inflation of the ruble, a decrease in the manufacturing sector from the crowding-out 
effect, and sub-optimal development of the service sector.  Recent studies of the Russian 
economy in the period from 1999 to 2007 showed that the manufacturing sector actually 
grew in this time, a development that apparently refutes the “Dutch disease” theory.80  
However, Corden and Neary concluded that sometimes the manufacturing sector will not 
decline in periods of resource booms.  In their words, “The manufacturing sector of a 
country may include some non-traded as well as traded goods sectors, so that the decline 
of the sector as a whole, because of a resource boom, is by no means inevitable.”81  
These conflicting results, and the successes of other countries’ efforts to overcome their 
energy dependence, suggest that Russia may be able to overcome its constraints if certain 
actions are taken.   
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G. MODERNIZATION SUCCESSES 
In the past, countries that have managed to beat the resource curse have done so 
with effective government participation.  South Africa and the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) both managed to pursue different paths after decades of dependence on natural 
resources.  South Africa invested in its industrial sector while the UAE focused on 
building a Middle East financial center in Dubai.82  Other studies show that several 
Middle East countries have managed to establish highly productive and innovative 
companies through state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  The most notable examples of state-
led diversification are Saudi Arabia’s SABI Corporation and the UAE’s DP World.  By 
setting up new companies through state-owned enterprises, these states were able to force 
their economies into new sectors.   
One might argue that Russia needs to adopt similar measures and invest in non-
energy SOEs.  The elite reformers in Russia see the state as the primary vehicle for 
economic modernization through projects like Skolkovo Park.  Even though these states 
and Russia are similar in their energy dependent economic structures, Russia does not 
exhibit the two criteria of successful rentier states in managing SOEs.  According to 
Hertog, there are two main factors critical for successful SOEs, “The absence of a 
populist-mobilizational history and substantive regime autonomy in economic policy-
making.”83  Russia’s regime does not have the luxury to operate independently of the 
economic policy sphere and the Russians have a rich history of “economic populism,”84 
which is tied to the communist legacy.    
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Another view of modernization success, and one that is crucial for Russia, is 
direct privatization of state-run companies.  The difficulties of modernization in resource 
rich countries stem from the lack of institutions that are needed to carry out radical 
reform, and result in weaker socio-economic structures.  As Erin Weinthal points out,  
Scholars and policy makers alike have become increasingly convinced that 
it is possible to combat the resource curse through a broad array of 
policies that include natural resource funds, economic diversification, 
transparency and accountability, and direct distribution.  These solutions, 
however, rely on a degree of institutional capacity that is widely absent in 
mineral-rich countries, and thus they are prone to suffer from the 
aforementioned negative economic, political, and social outcomes.85 
Russia plans to start another wave of privatization in the next few years, but it is 
going to be limited to non-strategic sectors and does not go far enough.  Russia should 
realize that SOEs like the Skolkovo Project are not going to be able to bring Russia into 
the realm of global innovation.  Therefore, Russia needs to adopt a comprehensive plan to 
sell the majority of ownership of most of its assets in both energy and non-energy sectors. 
H. CONSEQUENCES OF INACTION 
There are many opinions on what approach should be adopted in dealing with 
Russia’s energy dependence, both externally through coercion, and internally through 
state-control.  Some in the West see maintaining the status quo as the best option since it 
will not interrupt their current energy supplies from Russia.  The failure to adopt a 
comprehensive energy policy has left the EU and NATO split on their ability to foster 
better energy relations with Russia.  Inaction and failure to engage Russia will only result 
in a Russia more reliant on energy as a foreign policy tool.  As Keith Smith of the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies points out, inaction by the West “only reinforced 
the view in the Kremlin that energy coercion is a risk-free policy.”86 After the Great 
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Recession in 2008, Russia now realizes the need for integration into the international 
economy.  The political power of its energy exports has begun to decrease from the 
recent past, due to Europe’s decreased demand of gas imports, new contracts with 
suppliers in Central Asia and China, and new investments in alternative energy in 
Europe.87 
The question must be asked, by assisting Russia in its modernization efforts, what 
does the U.S. and EU have to lose?  The benefits of an energy agreement are win-win for 
both sides.  By establishing a renewal for a future energy agreement between the EU and 
Russia, it could lessen the current fragile and tense energy relations that continue to act as 
a barrier for Russian integration into the West.  The EU states could become less at risk 
for future energy crises, the U.S. and NATO could continue to strengthen their 
partnership with Russia in multiple areas, and Russia could in turn use the agreement to 
build upon the support of the European Union through the P4M.  Without both economic 
and political participation from the West and Russia, energy dependence will remain one 
of the primary barriers for Eurasian integration and Russian economic prosperity. 
The European Union and the U.S. need to encourage privatization in Russia, as 
this will lead to new opportunities in other sectors.  An increase in additional foreign 
investments can alter the cost-benefit ratio of hegemonic and imperialistic strategies in 
turn for liberalization and could corrode the will of the political elites by diminishing 
their power in the energy sector.  New entrepreneurs will begin to effectively manage the 
companies and become more productive over time.  Russia might display some 
characteristics of the “oil curse,” but recent evidence gives hope and defines solutions for 
it to achieve economic prosperity.  Establishing SOEs might be preferable to the hard-line 
reformers since they still are able to reap the benefits of rent-seeking, but SOE projects, 
like the Skolkovo Park alone, will not modernize Russia.  The liberal reformers should 
aggressively pursue privatization along with establishing higher standards in the rule of 
law, which will allow Russia to improve the investment climate, further stimulating FDI 
                                                 
87 Keith Smith, "Managing the Challenges of Russian Energy Policies: Recommendations for U.S. and 
EU Leadership," Center for Strategic and International Studies (November 2010), 18, (accessed December 
5, 2010).  
 40
in non-energy sectors.  It will take a multi-faceted approach inside Russia, as well as 
external support from Europe and the U.S. to erode decades of dependence on energy in 
Russia. 
Increased European Union investment in new Russian economic sectors in the 
next privatization plan through the P4M forum, may contribute to the mutual integration 
of European and Russian economies.  This integration can develop into more modest 
energy policies and help establish a future EU-Russia energy agreement.  As the Russian 
economy becomes more integrated with the West, the cost-benefit ratio for hegemonic 
tendencies through energy coercion may fall, and begin to give birth to radical reform in 




V. RUSSIA’S ECONOMIC SCENARIOS 
A. RUSSIA’S ECONOMIC SCENARIOS 
Much debate has been waged over potential future scenarios of the authoritarian 
capitalist economy of Russia, and the impact Medvedev’s current modernization efforts 
will have on its economic and political structure.  The scenarios for the future of Russia’s 
economy are based on static past factors that do not take into account future economic, 
political, or social crises that could fundamentally shift the direction of economic 
development for a country in a short time span.  The unknowns are great in economic 
analysis, but certain economic data can provide vital insights into the crucial criteria 
necessary for economic development.  These variables can help determine the underlying 
direction of any economy, as long as economic data is available.   
As of the recent financial crises in 2008, critics and economists have begun to 
question the West’s free market model and some even venture to ponder if authoritarian 
capitalist regimes like China and Russia are the future economic models to pursue.  As 
we shall analyze, these regimes are built upon a false sense of stability and will 
eventually proceed towards full democracy once certain socioeconomic areas are 
developed.  As Azar Gat states of authoritarian capitalist regimes, “Authoritarian 
capitalist regimes are at least successful-if not more so-in the early stages of 
development, but they tend to democratize after crossing a threshold of economic and 
social development.”88  In order to study the direction of the Russian economy and how it 
might be able to “cross the threshold of economic and social development,” it helps to 
analyze potential economic scenarios for Russia’s future.   
 
                                                 





There are numerous studies on the direction that Russia’s economic 
modernization will take the country.  Most of the theories revolve around three or four 
paths forward for Russia’s economic progress or regress.  In “Structural Alternatives for 
Russia’s Socioeconomic Development,” A. Shastitko and other authors describe four 
potential routes for Russia’s future: “inertia, rentier, mobilization, and modernization.”89  
Additional scenarios for the Russian economy, outlined by the World Economic Forum, 
produce a similar analysis of the potential outcomes.  The World Economic Forum’s 
“Russia and the World: Scenarios to 2025” outlines three paths that the Russian state 
could proceed down in the next fifteen years: “Oil’s Curse,” “Long March,” and 
“Renaissance.”90  For clarity, the three scenarios from the World Economic Forum will 
be used for this analysis. 
Figure 1 provides a window into the varying factors that will contribute to the 
outcome of the modernization process.  The three scenarios listed above are dependent on 
the x and y axis variables.  On the y-axis is rent-seeking and rule of law, on the x-axis is 
resource based economy and diversified economy.  The first scenario is, the “Oil’s curse” 
(OC) and shares many similarities with the first strategy of “inertia,” where the Russian 
government refuses to overcome the challenges of modernization, and allows itself to 
continue to be influenced by its reliance on energy resources, which will result in failure 
to improve economic and political freedoms.  As stated at the World Economic Form, “In 
Oil’s Curse, a political class bent on its own enrichment is in charge, resulting in slow 
growth, poor levels of investment in infrastructure, capital flight, increased corruption 
and a decline in the competitiveness of domestic industries.”91  This scenario would 
foster a further increase in state regulation in the market, and have drastic impacts on 
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https://members.weforum.org/en/initiatives/Scenarios/RussiaScenarios/index.htm (accessed August 20, 
2010). 
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future economic and political stability in the country.  The “inertia” or “Oil’s curse” 
strategy concludes that Russia will maintain its current political and economic structure 
and will reject any substantial changes to reform.  “It calls for the government to 
maneuver tactically among interest groups, giving priority to economic and political 
“stability” (understood as preservation of the status quo) over development.” 92  
 
Figure 1.   From World Economic Forum “Russia and the World: Scenarios to 2025”93 
The second pathway in Shastitko’s model is the “rentier-mobilization” scenario, 
or the “Long March” (LM) in the World Economic Forum’s study.94  In this model, 
Russia will use high revenues from energy resources for redistribution efforts to improve 
the impoverished population while maintaining its current structure.  “This option calls 
for a de facto increase in social obligations met by the state and increased government 
                                                 
92 Shastitko, Afontsev and Plaksin, Structural Alternatives for Russia's Socioeconomic Development, 
4–23. 
93 World Economic Fourm, World Scenarios Series "Russia and the World: Scenarios to 2025." 
94 Ibid. 
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spending….”95  This rentier strategy is thought to increase the size of the middle class 
and solve many of the historic social problems.  The LM would show a considerable 
increase in social and domestic programs to provide for public critical shortfalls in the 
rule of law, but it will not address the fundamental issues of the socioeconomic 
dependence on energy.  It also would not address the fundamental structures that are 
lacking in the political and economic institutions.  It would rely on the high price of 
commodities to subsidize its programs, but in the long term would not prove 
economically beneficial.   
The final scenario in Shastitko’s study is “modernization,” or “Renaissance,” 
(REN) in the World Economic Forum’s model, which would create a restructuring of 
social and economic institutions that would foster innovation and competition in the 
private sector.96  The REN scenario would be a fundamental restructuring of social and 
economic institutions critical for economic modernization.  It would “foresee initially 
gradual, but eventually wide-reaching governance reforms combined with market reforms 
leading to strong GDP growth, an increase in real income, and general improvement in 
the quality of life for the population at large.”97  This path would be most difficult in the 
short term, due to political and social barriers, but the most rewarding in the long run 
once liberal economic policies are given time to succeed.  Shastitko points to two main 
criteria that must be addressed: creation of a “favorable intellectual environment” and 
“development of nonprofit organizations.”98  The “modernization” strategy has short 
term economic and political volatility, roughly two to three years, since modernization 
often takes time to be fully implemented in the economic and social arenas.  It would face 
considerable resistance from portions of the government that would not seek to gain from 
modernization.  The “Oil Curse,” “Long March,” and “Renaissance” scenarios provide a 
structure in analyzing the challenges that face Russia in the efforts to modernize. 
                                                 
95 Shastitko, Afontsev and Plaksin, Structural Alternatives for Russia's Socioeconomic Development, 
4–23. 
96 A. Shastitko, S. Afontsev and S. Plaksin, "Structural Alternatives for Russia's Socioeconomic 
Development," Russian Social Science Review 50, no. 4 (July–August 2009), 4–23. 
97 World Economic Fourm, World Scenarios Series "Russia and the World: Scenarios to 2025," 7. 
98 Shastitko, Afontsev and Plaksin, Structural Alternatives for Russia's Socioeconomic Development, 
4–23. 
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B. ECONOMIC STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT 
The World Economic Forum assumes that each country has to achieve certain 
levels in the different pillars in order to achieve economic prosperity.  The World 
Economic Forum separates development into three stages of development, Stage 1 
“factor-driven,” Stage 2 “efficiency-driven,” and Stage 3 “innovation- driven” 
economies.  Russia is currently in the Stage 2, “efficiency-driven” category (see Figure 
2).   
To analyze the potential outcome for the current modernization effort, an 
empirical analysis of global economic indexes can provide interesting insights into the 
critical factors that could move Russia into the next stage of economic development, from 
a Stage 2 “efficiency-driven” economy into a Stage 3 “innovation driven” economy.  A 
radical modernization effort would see Russia shift into Stage 3 development and would 
be consistent with the “Renaissance” scenario, where complete economic and political 
systems would be liberalized.  The “LM” scenario would see Russia maintain its 
economic and political status quo and maintain its current development position as a 
Stage 2 country.  The “OC” scenario would severely degrade the economic and political 
actors over time, leading to rampart abuses in political and economic power, which could 
result in negative growth and capital flight.  The OC would be consistent with sliding 
backwards in economic development into a potential Stage 1 country and potential 
regime change.   
After the 2008 financial crises, a renewal for modernization in Russia has started.  
“Smart Russia” as it is also known, a plan by the Kremlin to seemingly transition Russia 
from a Stage 2 to a Stage 3, “innovation-driven” economy.  The first step to becoming a 
Stage 3 is to begin the transition process by entering the transition Stage between 2 and 3, 
see Figure 3. 
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Figure 2.   From World Economic Forum’s Twelve pillars of competitiveness99 
Russia is lacking in the primary pillars that allow for a country to transition from a 
Stage 2 to Stage 3 country.  In order for Russia to become a member of the Stage 3 
category, it needs further develop many of the efficiency, innovation, and sophistication 
factors listed in Figure 2.  One of the criteria for a country to transition to the next 
category is to achieve a certain level of GDP per capita.  Figure 3 lists the annual GDP 
per capita levels in determining the countries stage of development.  Russia currently has 
8,694 GDP per capita (U.S.) in 2009, leaving it on the border of becoming a transitioning 
from Stage 2 to Stage 3 country, see Figure 3.100 
 
                                                 
99 World Economic Fourm, Members of the Global Competitiveness Report Advisory Board, The 
Global Competitiveness Report 2010–2011. 
100 World Economic Fourm, Members of the Global Competitiveness Report Advisory Board, The 
Global Competitiveness Report, 2010–2011, 286. 
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Figure 3.   From World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, Income 
thresholds for establishing stages of development101 
Russia has been a Stage 2 country for quite some time, unable to reach the 
necessary levels for Stage 3, or even become a part of the transitioning 2–3 countries.  
Russia has improved its over all standing in GDP per capita in the past decade, however, 
it is still lacking in the crucial areas of innovation-driven economies.  The most 
developed and economic prosperous nations are members of Stage 3 (see Figure 4).   
Russia has made great gains in its overall wealth of its population in the past 
decade, but has since declined from the 2008 financial crises.  Recent reports indicate 
modest growth of 4 percent GDP in 2010, and predicted growth of 4 to 5 percent GDP in 
2011.  If Russia is able to sustain these growth rates it could easily increase its probability 
to reach a higher stage of economic development.  Hypothetically, if Russia achieves 4 
percent GDP growth over the next few decades it could reach Stage 3 level incomes in 
seventeen years, or around 2028.  However, increases in income alone are not sufficient 
to achieve a higher stage of economic development, improvements in governance and 
other economic variables also contribute to the final stage.  
 
                                                 
101 World Economic Fourm, Members of the Global Competitiveness Report Advisory Board, The 
Global Competitiveness Report, 2010–2011, 10. 
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Figure 4.   From World Economic Forum’s GCI, Russia’s Key Indicators102 
 
Figure 5.   From World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, List of 
countries/economies at each stage of development103 
                                                 
102 World Economic Fourm, Members of the Global Competitiveness Report Advisory Board, The 
Global Competitiveness Report, 2010–2011, 286. 
103 World Economic Fourm, Members of the Global Competitiveness Report Advisory Board, The 
Global Competitiveness Report, 2010–2011. 
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The recent successes of former communist countries in Eastern Europe are 
evident in their ability to begin their transition into a Stage 3 country (Estonia, Latvia, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and Czech Republic.)  To understand what factors are 
required to transition Russia forward it is vital to look at other economic indexes over 
time to determine the factors that contributed to these countries’ abilities to move up in 
the development stages, and which areas Russia needs to improve.   
C. ECONOMIC INDEXES 
The framework that will be used will focus on multiple global indexes, and will 
conduct a factors analysis and discriminate analysis to determine what areas Russia lacks 
in its economic and political components, and if state-managed economic reforms 
through the “Smart Russia” efforts will be sufficient in transitioning Russia to the Stage 3 
category.  This analysis will identify the main variables required to transition to the Stage 
3 levels.  There are three main economic indexes that will be statistically analyzed to 
receive the necessary results.  These three indexes will be combined in order to cover the 
economic, political, and social aspects of the Russian state.  The three are the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index Score (GCI), the World Bank 
Governance Indicators (WBGI), and the Heritage Foundation of Economic Freedom 
Scores (EF).  These three indexes make up a total of 29 variables as listed in Table 1. 
1. World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) 
For over three decades, the GCI has provided economic data on a whole range of 
factors that are considered necessary criteria for a state to become competitive and 
economically prosperous.  The World Economic Forums’ Global Competitiveness Report 
consists of twelve pillars that contribute to the certain stage a state receives and consist 
of: institutions, infrastructure, macro-economy, health and primary education, higher 
education and training, goods market efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial market 
sophistication, technological readiness, market size, business sophistication, and 
innovation (see Figure 2). 
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2. World Bank Governance Indicator (WBGI) 
Since 1996, the World Bank has collected data in countries that give numerical 
rankings to six pillars of governance.  Due to the decline in many areas of economic and 
political freedoms across the globe, increased interest has been given to the governance 
factors in determining the success and failure of economic reforms or modernizations.  
The WBGI entails data from 213 countries over the period 1996-2009.  When analyzed 
with the economic data of the World Economic Forum’s GCI, the WBGI provides critical 
evidence of the importance of governance factors in determining economic progression 
of Russia.  The six pillars of Governance as defined by the World Bank in Figure 5. 
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1. Voice and Accountability (VA) – capturing perceptions of the extent to which a 
country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 
2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PV) – capturing 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. 
3. Government Effectiveness (GE) – capturing perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. 
4. Regulatory Quality (RQ) – capturing perceptions of the ability of the government 
to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development. 
5. Rule of Law (RL) – capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence. 
6. Control of Corruption (CC) – capturing perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as 
well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
Figure 6.   From World Bank’s Governance Indicator 2010104 
In Russia’s case, its governance indicators are of grave concern as it ranks near 
the bottom percentile rank in the Europe/Eurasia region and among the developed 
nations, Table 1.  The relationship of the Governance Indicators in determining the stage 
of development is shown in Table 2.  Russia lies well below the mean average for Stage 3 
countries, and has consistent levels of a Stage 2 country.  In Table 2, Stage 1 to 3 are 
                                                 
104 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, Massimo Mastruzzi, World Bank Governance Indicators 2010–
2011The World Bank,[2010]), http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (accessed January 18, 
2011). 
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broken down into five groups to show a category for countries that are in transitioning to 
different stages, and their mean scores for each group, shown in Table 2. 
 
Percentile Rank Governance Score
(0-100) (-2.5 to +2.5)
Voice and Accountability 15 2009 22.3 -0.95
Political Stability 9 2009 21.7 -0.72
Government Effectiveness 11 2009 44.8 -0.28
Regulatory Quality 12 2009 35.2 -0.46
Rule of Law 17 2009 23.6 -0.77
Control of Corruption 15 2009 11.4 -1.12
Governance Indicator Sources Year
 
Table 1.   From World Bank Governance Indicators, Russia105 
                                                 
105 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, Massimo Mastruzzi, World Bank Governance Indicators 2011–
2011The World Bank,[2010]), http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (accessed January 18, 
2011). 
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Group Means on Governance Dimensions, World Economic Forum Development Stages, 2010-2011
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Voice Political Government Regulatory Rule Control of
Stability Effectiveness Quality of Law Corruption
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
1 Mean -0.547 -0.685 -0.714 -0.562 -0.761 -0.731
Number of Countries 38 38 38 37 30 38
Std. Deviation 0.557 0.813 0.389 0.443 0.461 0.388
2 Mean -0.739 -0.300 -0.267 -0.278 -0.415 -0.402
Number of Countries 25 25 25 25 22 25
Std. Deviation 0.649 0.787 0.582 0.710 0.552 0.723
3 Mean 0.015 -0.175 0.061 0.137 -0.223 -0.165
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 23 29
Std. Deviation 0.620 0.666 0.412 0.453 0.545 0.442
4 Mean 0.657 0.598 0.802 0.902 0.720 0.572
Number of Countries 15 15 15 15 13 15
Std. Deviation 0.680 0.320 0.303 0.331 0.378 0.456
5 Mean 1.127 0.761 1.462 1.358 1.443 1.488
Number of Countries 32 32 32 32 28 32
Std. Deviation 0.547 0.558 0.430 0.350 0.454 0.661
Total Mean 0.051 -0.038 0.183 0.240 0.109 0.097
Number of Countries 139 139 139 138 116 139
Std. Deviation 0.932 0.882 0.932 0.886 0.989 1.006
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
World Economic Forum Stages
 
Table 2.   Group Means on Governance Dimensions, World Economic Forum 
Development Stages, 2010–2011106 
3. Heritage’s Foundation, Economic Freedom Index (EF) 
The third and final index is the Economic Freedom Index.  Since 1995, the 
Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal have published an annual report detailing 
economic freedom in a state.  The Economic Freedom Index essentially measures the 
degree of freedom that is present in the economic and political spheres within a country.  
The score is made up of over ten factors including: 
1. Business Freedom 
2. Trade Freedom 
3. Fiscal Freedom 
4. Government Spending 
5. Monetary Freedom 
6. Investment Freedom 
                                                 
106 Factor and Discriminate analysis was conducted in partnership with Dr. Robert Looney, NPS, 
using SPSS statistical software. 
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7. Financial Freedom 
8. Property Rights 
9. Freedom from Corruption 
10. Labor Freedom 
With regards to Russia, it ranks near the bottom of all countries, with an overall 
score of 50.5 in the 2011 Economic Freedom Index, ranked 143rd out of 179 countries, 
and 41st out of 43 European countries.107  The current modernization plan will require 
Russia to address the ten pillars shown above and determine the degree of success the 
country has at becoming an innovative economy.  Figure 6 shows the scores of Russia in 
each of the ten pillars in the Economic Index 2010. 
 
50.7 Business Freedom AVG 64.3 25.0 Investment Freedom AVG 50.2 
68.2 Trade Freedom AVG. 74.8 40.0 Financial Freedom AVG 48.5 
82.7 Fiscal Freedom AVG. 76.3 25.0 Property Rights AVG 43.6 
65.1 Government Spending AVG. 63.9 22.0 Fdm. from Corruption AVG 40.5 
63.1 Monetary Freedom AVG. 73.4 62.9 Labor Freedom AVG 61.5 
  
Figure 7.   Russia Scores from Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom Index108 
In Tables 3 and 4, the group means for the eleven pillars of the Economic Freedom 
Index are displayed with the development stages, which show that Russia fails to meet 
the mean score for a group 3 country, and that it should be in a lower stage than 
previously ranked by World Economic Forum.  Russia’s overall score of 50.5 vs. a mean 
group 3 score of 61.89.  The three largest deficient areas in Russian scores are the failures 
of Investment Freedom (25 vs. mean of 54.31), Property Rights (25 vs. mean of 40.17), 
and Freedom from Corruption (22 vs. mean of 38.14), see Table 4.   
 
                                                 
107 Terry Miller, Kim R. Holmes, James M. Roberts, Anthony B. Kim, 2011 Index of Economic 
Freedom, Heritage Foundation, Heritage Foundation, Wall Street Journal,[2010]), 








Group Means on Economic Freedom Dimensions I, World Economic Forum Development Stages, 2010-2011
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Overall Business Trade Fiscal Government Monetary
Freedom Freedom Freedom Freedom Spending Freedom
Score
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
1 Mean 54.300 55.460 69.537 77.051 75.168 69.886
Number of Countries 38 38 38 37 37 37
Std. Deviation 5.867 11.605 7.503 9.418 15.816 5.591
2 Mean 57.260 65.150 74.792 82.204 71.667 66.329
Number of Countries 24 24 24 24 24 24
Std. Deviation 9.639 16.136 10.320 11.229 15.905 7.024
3 Mean 61.890 67.110 78.090 80.517 71.893 71.928
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29
Std. Deviation 6.263 9.410 7.970 7.884 16.450 4.942
4 Mean 68.910 72.550 84.136 80.693 63.229 72.879
Number of Countries 14 14 14 14 14 14
Std. Deviation 4.936 9.822 7.166 9.408 17.512 4.184
5 Mean 73.190 85.470 86.391 64.234 49.128 78.613
Number of Countries 32 32 32 32 32 32
Std. Deviation 6.899 10.272 3.562 14.439 19.451 3.810
Total Mean 62.330 68.380 77.696 76.059 66.496 72.055
Number of Countries 137 137 137 138 136 138
Std. Deviation 10.057 15.860 9.818 12.693 19.661 6.649
World Economic Forum Stages
 
Table 3.   Group Means on Economic Freedom Dimension I, World Economic Forum 
Development 
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Group Means on Economic Freedom Dimensions II, World Economic Forum Development Stages, 2010-2011
______________________________________________________________________________________________
Investment Financial Property Freedom from Labor 
Freedom Freedom Rights Corruption Freedom
______________________________________________________________________________________________
1 Mean 41.180 43.290 30.210 27.010 57.600
Number of Countries 38 38 38 37 37
Std. Deviation 14.861 12.318 8.918 6.482 14.868
2 Mean 45.430 43.750 35.220 31.000 60.429
Number of Countries 23 24 23 24 24
Std. Deviation 22.508 16.101 14.498 11.425 19.769
3 Mean 54.310 53.450 40.170 38.140 63.403
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29
Std. Deviation 16.568 12.328 13.462 8.855 12.870
4 Mean 68.570 63.570 62.500 54.500 66.621
Number of Countries 14 14 14 14 14
Std. Deviation 11.673 13.927 13.552 10.559 15.062
5 Mean 75.310 70.630 80.940 74.530 66.678
Number of Countries 32 32 32 32 32
Std. Deviation 12.885 12.165 12.472 14.213 18.589
Total Mean 55.550 53.980 48.440 43.970 62.366
Number of Countries 136 137 136 137 137
Std. Deviation 20.911 17.141 23.577 21.328 16.561
World Economic Forum Stages
 
Table 4.   Group Means on Economic Freedom Dimensions II, World Economic 
Forum Development Stages 
D. ECONOMIC FACTOR ANALYSIS 
After analyzing the indexes versus the development stages it has provided insights 
into the shortfalls of the Russia economic and political realities.  These results are 
consistent with previous views that Russia severely lacks the crucial ingredients for 
economic modernization.  These results will be further analyzed by conducting a factor 
analysis to see out of the 24 variables present in the merged data sets, were there any 
unique traits present, and what Russia’s prospects are in its modernization plan.  A 




Factor 1- Competitiveness Dimension 
Factor 2- Economic Freedom Dimension 
Factor 3- Labor Market Freedom/Efficiency Dimension 
Factor 4- Government Spending/Fiscal Dimension 
Factor 5- Trade Freedom Dimension 
 
Table 5.   Factor Analysis, Five Relevant Trends 
The five trends listed in Table 5 were then input into a rotated component matrix 
with the 24 variables from the three data sets, which encompass the economic 
competitiveness index (GCI), governance indicators index (WBGI), and economic 
freedom index (EF).  The five groupings of variables show distinct significance to the 




Factor Analysis, Competitiveness, Governance and Economic Freedom Components 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Source         Variable                                    Factor 1     Factor2     Factor3   Factor4    Factor5 
 
Factor 1 = competitiveness dimension, Factor 2, economic freedom dimension, Factor 3 = labor market 
freedom/efficiency, Factor 4 = government spending, fiscal dimension; Factor 5 trade freedom. 
 ______________________________________________________________________ 
GCI – Business Sophistication 0.737* 0.365 0.300 0.324 0.190 
GCI – Market Size 0.835* 0.009 -.146 0.036 0.087 
GCI -- Innovation 0.688* 0.338 .331 0.423 0.095 
GCI -- Macroeconomic Environment 0.675* 0.111 .141 -0.111 0.162 
GCI – Infrastructure 0.662* 0.313 .349 0.288 0.395 
GCI – Higher Education and Training 0.610* 0.267 .282 0.345 0.525 
GCI --Goods Market Efficiency 0.576* 0.463 .533 0.139 0.231 
GCI – Technological Readiness 0.573* 0.423 .335 0.366 0.409 
GCI – Financial Market Development 0.570* 0.464 .401 0.082 0.116 
WBGI – Government Efficiency 0.512* 0.493 .416 0.407 0.337 
 
EF – Monetary Freedom 0.284 0.792* -.011 0.179 -0.096 
EF – Investment Freedom 0.038 0.791* .231 0.117 0.370 
EF – Financial Freedom FIF10 0.111 0.737* .283 0.119 0.412 
EF – Overall Freedom Score  0.307 0.686* .525 -0.009 0.375 
WBGI – Regulatory Quality 0.411 0.635* .367 0.272 0.424 
WBGI – Voice and Accountability 0.188 0.599* .073 0.542 0.359 
EF – Property Rights 0.391 0.598* .403 0.443 0.231 
EF – Freedom From Corruption 0.449 0.535* .425 0.437 0.271 
WBGI – Control Over Corruption 0.424 0.527* .441 0.455 0.274 
WBGI --Rule of Law 0.451 0.485 .415 0.464 0.332 
EF – Business Freedom 0.290 0.452 .417 0.183 0.432 
 
EF – Labor Freedom -0.018 0.040 .833* -0.113 0.115 
GCI – Labor Market Efficiency 0.231 0.283 .785* 0.095 0.117 
GCI – Institutions 0.510 0.371 .598* 0.333 0.145 
 
EF – Fiscal Freedom -0.144 -0.255 .113 -0.832* 0.242 
EF – Government Spending 0.043 0.002 -.029 -0.824* -0.385 
 
EF – Trade Freedom 0.291 .332 0.146 0.033 0.757* 
GCI – Health and Primary Education 0.556 .224 0.159 0.162 0.621* 
WBGI – Political Stability 0.250 .299 0.375 0.407 0.433 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: Rotated Component Matrix, Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization; Rotation converged in 9 iterations. 
GCI = World Economic Global Competitiveness scores, 2010; WGBI = World Bank Governance 
Indicators, Scores, 2009, EF = Heritage Index of Economic Freedom Scores, 2010; * = loading greater than 
0.5. 
Table 6.   Factor Analysis, Competitiveness, Governance, and Economic Freedom 
Components109 
                                                 
109 Factor and Discriminate analysis was conducted in partnership with Dr. Robert Looney, NPS, 
using SPSS statistical software. 
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When Russia is compared with other emerging markets, specifically the BRIC 
countries, we can begin to see the patterns of how Russia scores comparatively, see Table 
7.  Russia scores comparatively well in labor market freedom and government spending, 
but is severely deficient in Factor 2, economic freedom dimension.  
 
BRIC Country Factor Scores
____________________________________________________________________________________
Country Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
____________________________________________________________________________________
Brazil 0.677 -0.348 -0.903 0.912 -0.662
China 2.913 -1.909 -0.271 -0.573 -1.394
India 1.507 -0.798 -0.510 0.103 -1.608
Russian Federation 0.973 -2.366 -0.314 -0.040 0.278
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Notes: Factor 1 = competitiveness dimension, Factor 2, economic freedom dimension, Factor 3 = labor 
market freedom/efficiency, Factor 4 = government spending, fiscal dimension; Factor 5 trade freedom.  
Russia scores the worst in economic freedom dimension, followed by labor market freedom.  
Table 7.   Country Factor Scores 
E. DISCRIMINATE ANALYSIS 
After the factors analysis, the five factors identified were used in a discriminate 
analysis to determine the accurateness of the World Economic Forum stages, and to 
determine if these variables are significant with a high degree of confidence in placing 
the country in the correct stage.  Also, what are the certain variables, out of the 24 
analyzed, that act as key variables in moving a country from one stage of development to 
the next, or conversely, decline to the next lower stage?   
The discriminate analysis added one variable at a time from the combined data set 
to eliminate all the variables until there were not significantly relevant changes in country 
grouping.  Out of the three data sets of over 24 variables, the discriminate analysis output 
showed that there were only 4 variables significant in organizing the five groups, see 
Table 8.  In order of most importance, Technological Readiness, Rule of Law, 
Infrastructure, and Innovation are the significant variables able to predict placement of 75 
percent of World Economic Forum countries. 
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Discriminant Analysis Variable Selection
Step
Entered Statistic df1 df2 df3 Statistic df1 df2 Sig Statistic df1 df2 Sig
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
1 Technological Readines 0.158 1 4 110.0 146.26 4 110.0 0.000
2 Rule of Law 0.118 2 4 110.0 51.953 8 218.0 0.000
3 Infrastructure 0.099 3 4 110.0 22.390 12 286.03 0.000
4 Innovation 0.086 4 4 110.0 26.288 16 327.53 0.000
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
At each step, the variable that minimizes the overall Wilks' Lambda is entered
Maximum number of steps is 36; Minimum partial F to enter is 3.84; Maximum partial F to remove is 2.71
Exact F Approximate F
Willks' Lambda
 
Table 8.   Discriminate Analysis Results 
Table 8 clearly identifies the main variables required for Russia to improve in 
order for it to transition into a Stage 3 country.  The discriminate variables identified to 
be the most important clearly show that Russia is lacking in all four areas, but is the most 
deficient in rule of law, with a score of -0.77, unable to reach the mean score of -0.30 for 
group three countries.  The modernization plan currently underway is slowly making 
improvements in the “technological readiness” and “innovation” variables with state-led 
technology ventures, but has not adequately addressed the other two variables of “rule of 
law” and “infrastructure.”  
A comparison with other emerging market countries (BRIC), Russia was 
predicted to be a group 2 with a 65 percent chance of placement, not the group 3 with a 
33 percent correct placement that the World Economic Forum placed them in, see Table 
9. 
Discriminant Analysis Group Placement Probabilities
______________________________________________________________________________________________
Country Original Discriminant Probability of Group Placement
WEF Placement  Stage 1  Stage 2  Stage 3
Group Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5
______________________________________________________________________________________________
Brazil 3 3 0.001 0.068 0.864 0.065 0.001
China 3 2 0.062 0.837 0.095 0.006 0.000
India 1 1 0.608 0.260 0.131 0.001 0.000
Russian Federation 3 2 0.004 0.650 0.325 0.021 0.000
 
Table 9.   Discriminate Analysis, Probability of Group Placement 
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The results from the factor and discriminate analysis provide in-depth analysis 
into the necessary variables for a country to transition to a higher level of development.  
According the results, Russia is actually lower than the Stage 2 the World Economic 
Forum classifies them, but actually a group 2, which is transitioning between Stage 1 and 
Stage 2, see Table 9.  It can be concluded that Russia is still yet to adequately address 
many areas that are crucial for drastic economic development.  The data indicates Russia 
is currently heading down the path of the “Long March” scenario, which is consistent 
with critics of the modernization efforts.  The “Long March” is just enough economic 
reform to maintain the current levels of political structure while seemingly adopting 
minimal liberal economic policies.  However, on a positive note, Russia is addressing two 
of the four variables identified in the discriminate analysis critical to transition to the 
higher stage of development, technology readiness and innovation.  The real unknown is 
whether these focused efforts in these technological areas will carry over into the political 
sphere to reach the next level of development.  
Recent Russia modernization efforts in technology and innovation through the 
“Smart Russia” campaign alone will undoubtedly be insufficient to bring Russia into a 
more prosperous stage of development.  The government needs to also address additional 
areas of the socioeconomic structures in Russia, specifically rule of law and 
infrastructure.  The economic analysis does not account for recent international economic 
tools that promote new partnerships that increase investment and rule of law adherence, 
such as the P4M, USRBC, and WTO.  These outside forces are beginning to offer the 
Russian economy a missing variable that could contribute to the development process and 
accelerate Russia forward to the much desired “Renaissance” scenario. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. THE WEST’S ROLE, ASSISTANCE OR ISOLATION? 
Russia is currently on the cusp of economic modernization or returning to the 
status-quo of economic stagnation from the lack of innovation, rule of law, and 
corruption in the Russian economy.  Beyond the obvious short comings of the Russian 
state, progress has been made over the past twenty years.  While the Kremlin is far from 
committing to complete economic modernization, outside actors will have to contribute 
to the long process of economic integration.  Patience and resolve are something 
Westerners and Russians must both adopt in promoting a steadfast commitment to 
increase economic cooperation.  Westerners must not forget that truly liberal and free 
market economies were not conceived in twenty years, but took a substantially longer 
time than what we have given the short life of the Russian Federation.  “Integration 
fatigue” has plagued the efforts of the U.S. and West in the past.110  We should give the 
Russian people the same unbiased economic assistance we have offered other states 
across the world when each embarks on a path towards free market principles.  Today, 
the world and Russia have enormous tools at their disposal for transforming a country 
forward, which can allow for positive factors to influence liberalization in a fraction of 
the time historic.  These tools must be used to focus their efforts on the most important 
areas in the Russian economy that are prohibiting progress, rule of law and diversification 
away from an energy dependent economy. 
Decreasing corruption and diversifying an energy dependent economy will prove 
challenging but should not remain the traits of Russia forever.  The window of 
opportunity to assist in defeating these traits is currently open, as Russia is reaching out 
for economic cooperation.  While political unknowns remain in Russia’s future and could 
potentially shift the direction of any economic reforms in a short time, most Russian 
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leaders admit the need for a new direction in their economic policies.  Increases in 
foreign direct investment can assist Russia in overcoming these areas if they are allowed 
into the strategic sectors so closely guarded by the Russia regime.  Privatization of its 
highly guarded strategic sector is the first step that Russia must pursue to encourage 
foreign investors and governments of its real commitment for economic integration. 
The recent actions by the Russian government with the “Smart Russia” movement 
is indicative of the consensus within the leadership that the current dependence on 
energy, is not the way forward for Russia if it wants to become a truly developed nation 
within the international economic system.  While the Skolkovo project is impressive on 
paper, it alone can not provide Russia with the missing variables in economic 
transformation.  Additional support will be required, most notably from outside actors, 
U.S., Europe, and WTO, which can help provide Russia the missing variables for 
economic transformation into the world economic market. 
International organizations such as the EU, WTO, and U.S.R.B.C. can assist in 
fostering the investment climate that spurs innovation and international economic 
prosperity.  The Partnership for Modernization (P4M) is a substantial economic forum for 
financial assistance and adherence to pro-business regulations.  Assistance goes both 
directions, Russia needs to agree to adhere to the additional regulations that come from 
membership in these institutions to clearly display its level of commitment to reform and 
integration   One of the first steps in economic integration will be U.S. and European 
support for Russia’s entrance in the WTO, which will assist in increasing below standard 
levels of rule of law and intellectual property rights to Western norms.  
Russia displays some signs of the “oil-curse,” but evidence shows that with 
effective government policy, along with international integration, Russia can move into 
new sectors that can create a strong and viable middle class, thus overcoming the effects 
of the oil-curse and potentially allowing for radical modernization.  The strength of the 
middle class in Russia is the primary vehicle for demanding new ways of economic and 
political reforms.  The current stalemate between the elite reformers and liberal reformers 
can move in the favor of liberal reformers if evidence for more democratic reforms shows 
to be beneficial for the state and public sectors.  Once time and liberal reforms have a 
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chance for success, the cost-benefit of pursuing hegemonic and transnational policies will 
decline in favor of liberal principles.  Inaction by the West, due to Cold War mentalities 
will only solidify the actions of Putin and the elite reformers who wish to maintain the 
status-quo.  The “neocontainment” strategies supported by some critics of Russian 
integration often ignore the different realities of the power of economic integration in the 
twenty-first century.  By continuing with past containment strategies it could foster the 
very environment that they so reject.  As stated by Samuel Charap, 
The neocontainment strategy has the appeal of seeming tough on Russia.  
However, it is likely to worsen the very trends that its proponents find 
objectionable.  Isolating Russia could make the Kremlin less likely to 
cooperate with the international economic system, could undermine those 
in Russia who wish to deepen connections with the West, and could 
empower the reactionary hawks in the Russian political establishment who 
prefer a “fortress Russia” model, complete with tight political controls, a 
closed economy, domination in the former Soviet region, and greater 
confrontation and competition with the United States and its allies.  
Isolation would also eliminate external leverage or incentives for 
reform.111 
Russian partnership is vital in the twenty-first century in countering the expansion 
of other world powers, notably China.  Russia and the U.S. both wish to use global 
partnerships to counter a potential expansion of a Chinese East Asian empire.  While 
China strategically influences U.S. economic policy, Russia could become a strategic 
backstop for Chinese expansion, and vital for maintaining regional security in the twenty-
first century.  Russian support is also crucial to many U.S. national security policies at the 
Security Council, and a dedicated economic partnership is an area to solidly that support.   
B. A NEW DAY FOR RUSSIA? 
The economic scenarios and analysis chapter provides interesting insights into the 
shortfalls of the Russian economy.  The factors analysis shows that Russia is severely 
deficient in the economic freedom category, confirming the literature and conclusions of 
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critics of the modernization effort.  The discriminate analysis also shows the importance 
of similar variables in the quest for a stage three modernized country.  Technological 
readiness, rule of law, infrastructure, and innovation are crucial for any country, 
especially Russia in making its way forward in its modernization plan.  While recent 
modernization plans are trying to confront technological readiness and innovation, no 
substantial actions have been taken on rule of law, and could allow Russia to continue 
down the “Long March” scenario.  Or even worse, leaving Russia to its own vices could 
foster a much undesirable outcome, of the “Oil Curse” scenario, which could turn 
economic turmoil into a fragile regime on the brink of collapse. 
The consensus in the world is still out on the right form of government 
participation in its economic policies.  After the setback to free market democracies from 
the 2008 financial crises, and the successes of China’s autocratic-capitalist system, some 
predict resurgence in these regimes across the globe.  If hesitation or isolation is pursued 
in assisting Russia in its economic modernization, Russia could follow the path of China.  
Possibly, opening the door for Russia to pursue more autocratic economic policies and 
create future political and military unknowns not favorable to the West. 
The West and free world have more at stake than they realize in Russia’s 
economic modernization.  It is not only a test of the Russian people and its ability to 
overcome the remnants of the Soviet legacy, but it is also a test of the validity of the free-
market system and the principles that all market economies are founded upon.  The U.S. 
and EU should encourage businesses to invest in Russia through the forum of the P4M 
and U.S.R.B.C., encourage the Russian government to pursue radical privatization, and 
allow WTO membership to adhere Russia to international rule of law and business 
standards.  The West failed to assist in the areas of economic and political reforms after 
the fall of the Soviet Union, and settled for “integration fatigue” for the past two decades.  
The West can utilize twenty-first century tools of integrating Russia into the global 
economic system, and foster economic partnerships which could provide Russia an 
economic strategic link with the West and a foster the “Renaissance” scenario which will 
produce a new modernized democratic Russia. 
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APPENDIX DISCRIMINATE ANALYSIS TABLES 





1 2 3 4 5 Total
______________________________________________________________________________________
1 25 4 1 0 0 30
2 3 14 3 2 0 22
3 0 5 15 3 0 23
4 0 0 1 10 2 13
5 0 0 0 5 23 28
______________________________________________________________________________________
Percent
1 83.3 13.3 3.3 0.0 0.0 100.0
2 13.6 63.6 13.6 9.1 0.0 100.0
3 0.0 21.7 65.2 13 0.0 100.0
4 0.0 0.0 7.7 76.9 15.4 100.0
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.9 82.1 100.0
______________________________________________________________________________________
Note: 75% of orignial grouped cases correctly classified
Predicted Group Membership
 







Discriminant Analysis Grouping: Group Means
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
Rule Technological Innovation Infrastructur
of Law Readiness
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
1 Mean -0.785 120.710 101.250 120.110
Number of Countries 28 28 28 28
Std. Deviation 0.465 13.075 28.922 14.364
2 Mean -0.487 94.520 94.390 79.170
Number of Countries 23 23 23 23
Std. Deviation 0.488 15.802 31.276 17.515
3 Mean -0.303 66.650 86.900 84.550
Number of Countries 20 20 20 20
Std. Deviation 0.479 13.425 29.207 16.321
4 Mean 0.638 41.650 51.550 39.250
Number of Countries 20 20 20 20
Std. Deviation 0.336 13.196 23.068 13.768
5 Mean 1.565 15.800 17.680 17.920
Number of Countries 25 25 25 25
Std. Deviation 0.313 9.866 11.870 12.114
Total Mean 0.109 69.960 70.840 69.900
Number of Countries 116 116 116 116
Std. Deviation 0.989 41.153 41.253 40.399
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
Predicted Group for Analysis
 
Table 11.   Discriminate Analysis Grouping: Group Means 
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